Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
Origin. Löwenheim (1915), Skolem (1920). Countable models exist for satisfiable first-order theories. Upward version: arbitrarily large models. Paradox: set theory has countable models.
Models. Downward: if Γ has infinite model, has countable model. Upward: if Γ has infinite model, has models of every cardinality ≥|Γ|. Size not first-order definable.
Formalism.
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: If Γ has an infinite model M, then Γ has a countable model N. If M infinite and A ⊆ M, there exists elementary N ⪯ M with A ⊆ N and |N| ≤ |A| + |L| + ℵ₀.
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: If Γ has infinite model, then for all κ ≥ |Γ| + ℵ₀, Γ has a model of cardinality κ.
Proof techniques: Downward: Skolem functions + closure. Upward: add constants + compactness.
Skolem paradox: ZFC is countable (countably many axioms, given by schemas). If ZFC consistent, has countable model. Inside model: "uncountable" sets exist! Resolution: "uncountable" is relative to model.
Elementary substructure: M ⪯ N: M subset of N, same FOL truths. Tarski-Vaught test.
Corollaries: No first-order categorical theory of infinite structures. Finite model property failures. Nonstandard models.
Symbols.
| Symbol | Unicode | Name | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Γ | U+0393 | Gamma | A set of sentences: the theory |
| κ | U+03BA | Kappa | A cardinal: the size of the model produced |
| ω | U+03C9 | Omega | The first infinite ordinal, indexing L_ω₁ω |
| ₀ | U+2080 | Subscript zero | Index in ℵ₀ |
| ₁ | U+2081 | Subscript one | Index in ω₁, in L_ω₁ω |
| ℕ | U+2115 | Double-struck N | The naturals, not fixed up to isomorphism |
| ℝ | U+211D | Double-struck R | The reals, likewise |
| ℵ | U+2135 | Aleph | Cardinal notation |
| ≤ | U+2264 | Less than or equal | The bound on the elementary submodel |
| ≥ | U+2265 | Greater than or equal | The condition on κ in the upward theorem |
| ⊆ | U+2286 | Subset of or equal to | A ⊆ M: the set the submodel must contain |
| ⪯ | U+2AAF | Precedes above single-line equals | Elementary substructure: N ⪯ M |
| ℵ₀ | — | Aleph-null | The first infinite cardinal |
| |M| | — | Cardinality | The number of elements of M |
| M, N | — | Structures | A model and its elementary sub- or extension |
| A | — | Parameter set | The subset the submodel is required to contain |
| L | — | Language | Its cardinality enters the bound |
| L_ω₁ω | — | Infinitary logic | Keeps the downward theorem, loses the upward one |
| ZFC | — | Zermelo–Fraenkel with Choice | The theory of the Skolem paradox |
| Tarski-Vaught | — | Tarski-Vaught test | The criterion for being an elementary substructure |
Metatheory. Löwenheim (1915) proved the downward theorem for a single sentence; Skolem (1920) extended it to countable sets of sentences with what became Skolem functions, and Tarski and Vaught (1957) put it in its modern form — every infinite structure has an elementary substructure of cardinality at most |A| + |L| + ℵ₀ containing any prescribed subset A, verified by the Tarski-Vaught test. The upward direction is a compactness argument: adjoin κ new constants together with axioms saying they are pairwise distinct. Together the two mean that no first-order theory with an infinite model constrains the cardinality of its models, so absolute categoricity is impossible and only categoricity in a cardinal survives — which is what Morley (1965) classified, proving that categoricity in one uncountable cardinal forces it in all of them. Lindström (1969) showed the property is definitive rather than incidental: the downward theorem together with compactness characterizes first-order logic among regular abstract logics. The downward proof chooses Skolem functions and so uses choice; for countable languages dependent choice suffices.
Applies to. Model theory foundations. Nonstandard analysis. Set theory paradoxes. Infinite combinatorics.
Limitations. The theorem is a limitation more than it has limitations: it says first-order logic cannot control the size of its models, and the rest follows. No first-order theory with an infinite model is categorical, so ℕ, ℝ, and the cumulative hierarchy are none of them describable up to isomorphism; nonstandard models of arithmetic and of analysis exist for that reason and cannot be excluded by adding axioms. Skolem's own conclusion was that set-theoretic notions are relative: a countable model of ZFC contains a set it takes to be uncountable, because the bijection witnessing countability is not in the model. Nor does the pair of directions survive outside first-order logic — L_ω₁ω keeps the downward theorem and loses the upward one, and second-order logic under standard semantics loses both. And the models are asserted rather than exhibited, since the downward proof selects Skolem functions by choice.
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