Subvaluationism
Origin. Hyde (1997), Varzi: the dual of supervaluationism over the same precisification frame. Sub-truth is the possibility modality ◇—truth on at least one admissible precisification—so that borderline cases become truth-value gluts and the resulting consequence is paraconsistent.
Models. The same Kripke frame of admissible precisifications, read through ◇ rather than □. Sub-truth = ◇φ: φ holds at some accessible point. Borderline φ is both sub-true and sub-false (◇φ and ◇¬φ), a glut. Where supervaluationism reads the frame through necessity and gets gaps, subvaluationism reads it through possibility and gets gluts.
Formalism.
Shared precisification frame: W admissible precisifications, each classical. R ⊆ W × W admissibility relation.
Sub-truth modality: Sφ ≡ ◇φ: ∃w (vRw ∧ w ⊨ φ). Sub-false ≡ ◇¬φ. Dual to super-truth: Sφ = ¬D¬φ.
Gluts at the border: Borderline φ: ◇φ ∧ ◇¬φ. Both sub-true and sub-false. = contingency Δφ, read as glut not gap.
Non-contradiction fails: ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) not sub-true for borderline φ. Some point makes φ true, another makes ¬φ true. So φ ∧ ¬φ is sub-true somewhere.
Paraconsistent consequence: Γ ⊨ˢ φ iff φ sub-true whenever all of Γ sub-true. Explosion fails: gluts do not trivialize. Dual to the supervaluationist gap logic.
Duality: Super-truth □ ↔ sub-truth ◇. Excluded-middle failure ↔ non-contradiction failure. One frame, two consequence relations.
Symbols.
| Symbol | Unicode | Name | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| S, ◇ | U+25C7 | Sub-true | True on some admissible precisification |
| □ | U+25A1 | Super-true | Dual (supervaluation) |
| Δ | U+0394 | Glut | Contingent across precisifications |
| W | — | Frame | Admissible precisifications |
| R | — | Admissibility | Accessibility relation |
| ⊨ˢ | — | Sub-validity | Sub-truth consequence |
Metatheory. Sub-truth is the ◇-dual of super-truth on the same frame, inheriting its frame conditions (KT/S4/S5) dually. Consequence is paraconsistent: non-contradiction fails as excluded middle fails for supervaluationism, and explosion is invalid. Non-truth-functional. Higher-order vagueness again weakens the frame below S5.
Applies to. Vagueness treated by gluts. Paraconsistent handling of borderline cases. Dialetheic semantics. Semantic indeterminacy.
Limitations. Less standard than supervaluationism. Requires a paraconsistent consequence relation. Non-truth-functional. The frame of admissible precisifications must be fixed. Sacrifices classical meta-rules dually.
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